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I. INTRODUCTION

With the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) and S.B. 1070, Arizona
has a growing reputation for laying the foundation for state crackdowns on
illegal immigration.' In the days following the Supreme Court's decision
in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, in which it
upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act, there were predictions that state
efforts to enforce immigration would increase throughout the country. 2
1. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Upholds Arizona Law Punishing
Companies That Hire Illegal Immigrants, WASH. PosT (May 26, 2011),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-upholds-ariz-law-punishing(noting
companies-that-hire-illegal-immigrants/2011/05/26/AGhHG2BH story.html
that eight states have already passed employment laws similar to Arizona's, which
suggests states are following Arizona's method of decreasing illegal immigration
through laws that would punish employers for hiring undocumented workers).
2. See, e.g., Supreme Court Upholds Arizona Law Penalizing Hiring of Illegal
Immigrants, 79 U.S.L.W. 2602 (May 31, 2011) (speculating that because the Court

held that the Arizona law was not preempted by federal law, states will have greater
flexibility in enforcing immigration through state laws).
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People expressed fears that *racial discrimination against prospective
employees would increase. 3 There were even worries that the entire
farming industry in the United States might collapse if similar laws were
passed throughout the country.4
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court erred in holding that
federal immigration law does not preempt LAWA. The Arizona law's
definition of "license" not only prevents it from falling under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act's savings clause, but it also conflicts
with the Immigration Reform and Control Act's comprehensive scheme for
Part II of this
immigration regulation through employer sanctions.
Comment examines federal immigration law, such as the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), and state law such as LAWA.6
Part II also discusses the preemption doctrine. Part III argues that the
Supreme Court's preemption analysis did not properly take into account the
context of IRCA, leading the Court to incorrectly hold that IRCA does not
expressly preempt LAWA's sanctioning provisions.8 Part III also asserts
that the Supreme Court should have held that IRCA impliedly preempts
LAWA's employer sanctions.9 This Comment also advances that the
Supreme Court should have held that LAWA's mandate of E-Verify, a
federal voluntary program, is impliedly preempted. 0 Part IV of this
Comment offers policy arguments in support of amending IRCA." Finally,
Part V of this Comment concludes that to prevent a patchwork of state and
3. See, e.g., Editorial,Immigration: You Can'tRely on E- Verify, L.A. TIMES (May
27, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/27/opinion/la-ed-arizona-20110527
(suggesting that the Court's ruling will dissuade business owners from hiring people
who look or sound foreign because of fears of sanctions).
4. See Alicia Caldwell, Ag Industry Faces Labor Woes in Immigration Debate,

ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 4, 2011, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/
wireStory?id=13760679 (presenting concerns that it would be nearly impossible to
comply with E-Verify and maintain an industry in which eighty percent of all field
workers are illegal immigrants, despite efforts to recruit legal workers).
5. See infra Parts III.A, III.B (arguing that a contextual analysis demonstrates that
IRCA expressly preempts LAWA, and that IRCA impliedly preempts LAWA because
the state law falls within an exclusively federal area of regulation and it conflicts with
Congress's comprehensive immigration reform).
6. Infra Parts II.A, II.B.
7. Infa Part II.C.
8. See infra Part III.A (showing that a contextual analysis of IRCA, including
legislative history, does not support LAWA's licensing provisions).
9. See infra Parts III.B. 1-2 (arguing that because LAWA conflicts with the federal
government's comprehensive scheme of immigration it is both field and conflict
preempted).
10. See infra Part III.B.3 (suggesting that Arizona's mandate imposes unnecessary
burdens on the federal government and is thus impliedly conflict preempted).
11. See infra Part IV (suggesting that Congress should amend IRCA's savings
clause because of the likelihood of increased state laws imposing immigration-related
employer sanctions).
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local immigration-related employment laws, Congress should amend IRCA
in light of the Court's decision and the increasing number of state and local
immigration-related employment laws. 12
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Immigration andNationality Act and the
ImmigrationReform and ControlAct
Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952.
Considered a "comprehensive federal statutory scheme" for regulating
immigration and naturalization, the INA regulates the entry, residency
status, length of stay, removal, and naturalization of non-citizens.14
However, federal immigration regulations did not address the hiring of
undocumented immigrants until the passage of IRCA.' 5 IRCA amended
the INA to include provisions concerning the employment of unauthorized
aliens, and its goals include discouraging illegal immigration with little
employer disruption, while minimizing the possibility of employment
discrimination.17 The Supreme Court has referred to IRCA as a
"comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the
United States."' 8
Under IRCA, it is unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire an
unauthorized alien, or to hire an individual without complying with
enumerated employment verification requirements. 9 In addition, IRCA
12. See infra Part V (concluding that Congress intended IRCA to be enforced
uniformly).
13. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)) (revising existing
immigration laws and reorganizing the structure of immigration laws into one body of
text).
14. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353 (1976).
15. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7, 8, 20, 26, 29, 40, 42, and 50
U.S.C.); DeCanas,424 U.S. at 360 (observing that the employment of immigrants was
at most a "peripheral concern" of the INA).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 56 (1986) (suggesting that imposing
employer sanctions will eliminate the availability of employment for undocumented
aliens; and that because employer penalties only apply to acts of employment after the
enactment of IRCA, compliance with IRCA is designed to be "the least disruptive"
approach to business owners).
17. See S. REP. No. 99-132, at 8-9 (1985) (stating that IRCA's 1-9 employment
verification system minimizes employment discrimination against minorities who
"look or sound foreign," but are in the United States legally because it provides
employers who follow the proper procedure an affirmative defense against penalties for
knowingly employing an illegal ahen).
18. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006); see id § 1324a(b) (setting forth the
documents establishing employment authorization and identity and the employer's
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makes it unlawful to continue to employ a person if it becomes known that
the employee is, or has become, an unauthorized alien.20 If an employer
hires or continues to employ someone who is an unauthorized alien, an
administrative law judge must issue an order requiring the employer to
cease and desist its violations and pay a civil penalty. 2 1 The amount of the
civil penalty ranges from $375 to $16,000, depending on the number of
previous violations committed by the employer.22 If an employer does not
comply with the paperwork requirements for employment verification, an
administrative law judge will issue an order requiring the employer to pay a
civil penalty ranging from $110 to $1,100.23 Employers may be subject to
criminal penalties of $3,000 for each unauthorized alien and/or up to six
months' imprisonment if they engage in a pattern of knowingly hiring or
continuing to employ an unauthorized alien.24 In addition, if an employer
engages in "unfair immigration-related employment practices" such as
discriminating based on citizenship or nationality, an administrative law
judge shall issue an order against the employer and may impose civil
penalties.25 Finally, IRCA explicitly "preempt[s] any State or local law
[from] imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than licensing and
similar laws) upon those who employ. . . unauthorized aliens." 26 At the
heart of Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting is the
provision's savings clause, which expressly indicates that in enacting
IRCA, Congress did not intend to preempt state "licensing and similar

laws." 27

requirements for verifying an individuals' identity and retaining the 1-9 form).
20. Id. § 1324a(a)(2).
21. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).
22. See id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (establishing civil penalties from $250 to $10,000); 8
C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)(ii) (2011) (revising civil penalties for violations occurring on or

after March 27, 2008).
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5) (providing civil penalties from $100 to $1,000); 8
C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(2) (adjusting civil penalties for violations occurring on or after
September 29, 1999).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f).
25. Id. § 1324b(a)(1), (g)(l)-(2).
26. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
27. See generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine,
in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE
QUESTIONS 119, 121 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (explaining that savings clauses

are a tool for Congress to provide exceptions to express preemption provisions).
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B. The Legal Arizona Workers Act
1. , General Overview

Enacted in 2007, LAWA 2 8 defines who qualifies as an "unauthorized
alien" and imposes sanctions on employers who knowingly or intentionally
Further, LAWA requires Arizona
employ an unauthorized alien.29
employers to verify employment eligibility through the E-Verify
program.30 In a written statement upon signing the law, then-Arizona
Governor Janet Napolitano stated that an impetus for signing the bill was
Congress's failure to provide comprehensive immigration reform. 3 1
LAWA requires the attorney general or county attorney to investigate a
complaint that an employer knowingly or intentionally employed an
unauthorized alien.32 In that investigation, the attorney general or county
attorney must verify the immigration and work authorization status of the
employee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). 3 3 If state or local law
enforcement determines that the complaint is neither false nor frivolous, the
attorney general or county attorney must notify both local law enforcement
and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and must bring
action against the employer.34 While the court may only consider the
federal government's determination of an employee's status, this
determination merely creates a "rebuttable presumption of the employee's
lawful status," leaving open the court's ability to reject the federal
government's determination that the worker's employment is lawful.35
28. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -214 (Supp. 2011).
29. See id. § 23-211(11) (utilizing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) to define an
"unauthorized alien" as an alien who does not have the legal right or authorization to
work in the United States); id. § 23-212 (detailing employer sanctions for knowingly
employing an "unauthorized alien"); id § 23-212.01 (detailing employer sanctions for
intentionally employing an "unauthorized alien").
30. Compare id. § 23-214 (mandating the use of the E-Verify program, a federal

pilot employment verification system that employers may voluntarily utilize under the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 402), with

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (enacted as
Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997), Pub. L. No. 104208, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-656 (1996) (setting forth the voluntary nature of EVerify and explicitly stating that Homeland Security "may not require any person or
other entity to participate").
31. See Jonathan J. Cooper, Governor Signs Employer Sanctions Bill, Business
Groups Denounce Action, PHX. Bus. J. (July 2, 2007, 5:20 PM), http://
www.bizjoumals.com/phoenix/stories/2007/07/02/daily l l.html (quoting Napolitano's
reasoning that the number of illegal immigrants that come to Arizona to find work is
indicative of Congress's incapability of providing necessary comprehensive
immigration reform).
32. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(B), 23-212.01(B).
33. Id. §§ 23-212(B), 23-212.01(B).
34. Id. §§ 23-212(C)-(D), 23-212.01(C)-(D).
35. Id. §§ 23-212(H), 23-212.01(H) (stating that the court may take into
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2. Employer Sanctions

LAWA designates varying degrees of sanctions for an employer who
knowingly employs an unauthorized alien.36 Once a person alleges that an
employer violated the law by hiring an unauthorized alien, he or she may
If the
file a complaint to the attorney general or the county attorney.
to
employer
the
order
(1)
must
court
the
a
violation,
superior court finds
discharge any unauthorized aliens; (2) issue an order subjecting the
employer to a three year probationary period during which the employer
must file quarterly reports to the county attorney listing each new employee
hired; and (3) order the employer to file an affidavit stating that it has
terminated applicable employees and that it will not "intentionally or
knowingly employ an unauthorized alien" in Arizona.
Should an employer not file the affidavit with the county attorney within
three days after the court order, appropriate agencies must suspend all
designated business licenses held by the employer until the employer files
the affidavit.39 In addition, the court may order any appropriate agencies to
suspend all business licenses for up to ten days based on evidence
40
If an employer commits a second
demonstrating various factors.
violation, the court shall order the appropriate agencies to immediately and
permanently revoke all of the employer's licenses. 4 1 LAWA provides a
broad definition of "license," which as applied, can devastate businesses by
leading to what is commonly referred to as the "business death penalty,"
since a second violation leads to permanent revocation of all licenses held
by the employer.4 2
LAWA also designates varying degrees of sanctions for an employer
who intentionally employs an unauthorized alien.43 The penalties closely
follow those for knowingly employing an unauthorized alien, with few
consideration the federal government's determination of an employee's lawful status).
36. Id. §23-212(F)(1).
37. Id. § 23-212(B).
38. Id § 23-212(F)(1).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 23-212(F)(2).
42. See id. § 23-211(9)(a)-(b) (defining "license" as "any agency permit,
certificate, approval, registration, charter or similar form of authorization that is
required by law and that is issued by any agency for the purposes of operating a
business" in Arizona, and including within its definition articles of incorporation,
certificates of partnership, and grants of authority); id §§ 23-212(F)(2), 23212.01(F)(2) (ordering the permanent revocation of all licenses held by the employer
upon a second violation of the law); see also David G. Savage, The Enforcer ofBorder
Laws, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/23/nation/nanapolitano23 (quoting Napolitano designating the penalty for a second violation a
"business death penalty" since it would prevent a business from operating in Arizona).
43. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212.01.
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exceptions.4 4 For a first violation, the probationary period is five years, and
appropriate agencies must suspend all licenses for a minimum of ten days. 4 5
Similar to the sanctions for knowingly employing an unauthorized alien, a
second violation of intentionally employing an unauthorized alien leads to
the mandatory application of the "business death penalty.'A6
C. The PreemptionDoctrine
1. General Overview
Known as the "Supremacy Clause," the second clause of Article VI of
the United States Constitution establishes that the Constitution, federal
statutes enacted in accordance with the Constitution, and federal treaties
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land."47 The Supreme Court has long
held that under the Supremacy Clause, a state law that interferes with or
runs contrary to a federal law is preempted by it and is thus invalid.48
Congress may expressly preempt state law by explicitly stating so in the
language of the federal statute, or preemption may be implied depending on
the federal statute's structure and purpose. 49 Congressional intent is
essential in determining whether a federal law preempts a state action.50
The Court further recognizes two main types of implied preemption: field
preemption and conflict preemption.51 Field preemption occurs when a
state law attempts to regulate a field in which Congress intended federal
regulation to be exclusive. 52 Conflict preemption occurs when it is
impossible to comply with both federal law and state law, or when a state
44. Id. § 23-212.01(F).
45. Id. § 23-212.01(F)(1).
46. Id. § 23-212.01(F)(2).
47. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
48. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 212 (1824) (holding that
New York's licensing requirement for foreign vessels is preempted because it takes
away federal privileges granted by Congress and is thus inconsistent with federal
regulation of the coasting trade).
49. See generally Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
(describing express and implied preemption, and stating that the Court's overarching
task in any preemption case is examining the statute's structure and purpose).
50. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (stating
that a finding of preemption requires examining the entire statute for its purpose and
intended effects).
51. See generally Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (providing a brief explanation of implied
field and conflict preemption).
52. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that
congressional intent to exclusively occupy a field may be inferred where federal
regulation is "pervasive" or "so dominant" that it can be assumed federal law did not
intend for state or local laws to supplement it).
53. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(noting that an inquiry into congressional intent is unnecessary to find that a federal law
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law presents an obstacle to executing the entire scope of Congress's
purposes and objectives. 54

2. The PreemptionDoctrineand Immigration Law
immigration is an exclusive power of the federal
However, the Court has also expressed that this
government.
does not automatically preempt every state or local
power
constitutional
law pertaining to immigrants.56 Even though DeCanas v. Bica seems to
stand for the proposition that state laws may regulate immigration though
employment practices because it is within states' police powers to regulate
employment relationships and because regulation of immigration is limited
to determining admittance and conditions of remaining in the United States,
DeCanas was decided ten years prior to the enactment of IRCA.57 Thus,
because IRCA instituted a carefully balanced, comprehensive regime for
regulating immigration through employer sanctions laws, DeCanas might
Nevertheless, DeCanas' broader holding,
be decided differently today.
that state and local laws are not automatically preempted if they deal with
an immigration-related matter, is still valid law.59
Regulating

D. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting

1. Opinions Below
In response to the enactment of LAWA, a diverse group of plaintiffs,
preempts a state law when it is physically impossible to comply with both).
54. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (stressing that when a state
law impedes the purposes and objectives of Congress it violates Congress's supremacy
in the field of federal regulation); see also Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 497 U.S. 481,
494 (1987) (stating that a state law is preempted if it "interferes with the methods" a
federal statute enumerates to reach its goal since Congress carefully balances both
public and private interests in developing its methods).
55. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (articulating the
repeatedly-held position of the Court that regulation of immigration is exclusively a
federal power).
56. See id. at 355-56 (stating that for a state law to be preempted it must be a
regulation of immigration, which the Court defines as a determination of who can be
admitted into the country and the conditions under which a non-citizen may stay).
57. See id. at 357-60 (suggesting that because the primary concern of the INA is
with the terms and conditions of admittance into the country, and because employment
is beyond the scope of the INA, there is no reason to withdraw the power to regulate
employment of undocumented immigrants from the state).
58. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)
(stating that IRCA's comprehensive scheme for employer sanctions made prohibiting
the employment of undocumented immigrants central to federal immigration law and
policy).
59. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 359 (holding that for the INA to field preempt states
from regulating in an area that impacts aliens, there must be a showing that Congress
intended to exclude states from enacting regulations on the specific issue).
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including non-profit corporations, chambers of commerce, trade
associations, a community development corporation, and an immigration
reform coalition, filed a pre-enforcement lawsuit challenging the Act on
several grounds. First, the Plaintiffs argued that the Act violated IRCA's
preemption clause.o Second, they contended that the Act and IRCA
conflicted with each other.61 Third, they asserted that the voluntary use of
E-Verify under federal law prohibited Arizona from requiring employers to
participate in the program.62 Finally, they contended that the Act violated
both procedural and substantive due process of law, the federal Commerce
Clause, Arizona's constitutional separation of powers, and Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. 63 The
District Court dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of standing. 4
The Plaintiffs refiled their complaint, dropping the Governor as a
defendant, while adding the Arizona County Attorneys and the Director of
the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, which presumably resolved the issue
of standing.65 The District Court held that IRCA does not preempt
LAWA.66 It also ruled that LAWA does not violate Arizona employers'
right to procedural due process. 6 7 Finally, the District Court held that
LAWA does not violate the federal Commerce Clause.68
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings
and held that IRCA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts LAWA.6 9
60. See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (D.
Ariz. 2007) (contending that the Act does not fall within IRCA's savings clause).
61. See id. (asserting that LAWA is impliedly preempted by IRCA).
62. See id at 976-77 (arguing that the mandatory use of E-Verify is impliedly
preempted by IRCA).
63. See id. at 977 (contending that employers' E-Verify participation requirements,
including signing a Memorandum of Understanding which grants the federal
government access to the employer's E-Verify and employment-related documents and
to its employees for interviews, is a forced waiver of employers' Fourth Amendment
rights to be free from warrantless federal searches of employment records).
64. See id. at 985 (dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
grounds that there was no justiciable case or controversy against the Defendants, the
Governor and the Attorney General of the State of Arizona, and the Director of the
Arizona Department of Revenue, since they do not have authority to enforce LAWA).
65. See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040-41
(D. Ariz. 2008) (reviewing procedural history and stipulations of the parties, and noting
that the defendants reserved the right to challenge standing on appeal).
66. See id. at 1046 (arguing that because the Act is a licensing law, it fits within the
plain meaning of IRCA's savings clause).
67. See id. at 1058 (concluding that the Plaintiffs failed to show that section 23212(H) of the Arizona Revised Statutes does not meet minimal due process
requirements).
68. See id at 1061 (maintaining that because the Act does not regulate out-of-state
employees, it does not violate the Commerce Clause).
69. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 985-86 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that because the Act does not strive to define work eligibility and is only
a licensing measure that enforces federal immigration laws, it falls within IRCA's
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The Ninth Circuit also held that LAWA does not facially violate
employers' right to procedural due process.70 In an amended opinion, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the Plaintiffs' argument that LAWA impliedly
conflicts with IRCA because LAWA's potential sanctions are harsher than
IRCA's, and concluded that there was an insufficient basis for holding that
LAWA's sanctions impliedly conflict with IRCA.
2. Supreme Court of the United States Opinion

The Supreme Court heard the case to consider whether federal
immigration law preempts the sanction and E-Verify provisions of
LAWA.72 Affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision in a five to three vote,
the Court held that IRCA does not preempt LAWA's "licensing" sanctions
or its requirement that employers utilize the E-Verify program.7 4
In its express preemption analysis, the Court utilized a broad definition
of "license" to conclude that IRCA does not preempt LAWA. 75 Further,
the Court emphasized that because there is nothing in the statutory text to
suggest that the "broad phrasing" of IRCA's savings clause does not
support LAWA's "licensing" sanctions, it would not conclude that LAWA
conflicts with IRCA.76 LAWA's adoption of a significant amount of
language from IRCA was a crucial factor for the Court to rule that it did not
conflict with federal law.77 The Court also relied on general licensing laws
savings clause), amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009).
70. See id. at 988 (concluding that the district court correctly held that the Act

provides sufficient due process because under LAWA, employers have an opportunity
to be heard and to rebut an employee's unauthorized status in superior court before
sanctions are imposed).
71. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 859-60 (9th Cir.
2009) (reasoning that because there have been no complaints filed under the Act, there
is no record establishing the Act's effect on employers, thus the Plaintiffs' argument is
too speculative).
72. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973
(2011) (introducing preemption as the question presented to the Court).
73. See id. at 1987 (noting that Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case).
74. See id. at 1973 (holding that LAWA's licensing sanctions are not expressly
preempted by IRCA because they fall within the plain text of IRCA's savings clause,
and that LAWA's licensing sanctions and mandatory use of E-Verify are not impliedly
preempted because they do not conflict with federal law).
75. See id. at 1977-79 (using definitions of "license" from the Webster's Third
New International Dictionary and the Administrative Procedure Act to counter the
Petitioners' argument that the Arizona law is not a licensing law).
76. See id. at 1980 (asserting that the Court will not read IRCA's savings clause
narrowly unless there is a textual basis to do so, nor will it consider IRCA's legislative
history, since only statutory text is authoritative). But see Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (arguing that interpretation of statutes requires reading the
entire text as well as considering the purpose and context of the statute).
77. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981-82 (providing that because LAWA utilizes
crucial language and pertinent provisions from IRCA, it falls within the authority that

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

11

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 9

936

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:4

not being a major area of federal concern to argue that LAWA does not
directly interfere with the operation of IRCA. The Court upheld LAWA's
E-Verify mandate on the ground that the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) does not contain language that
restricts state action such as requiring a person or business to participate in
the program. 9
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that IRCA preempts LAWA because
an examination of LAWA demonstrates that it is not merely a "licensing"
law, and thus IRCA's savings clause does not apply.80 Justice Breyer
maintained that IRCA balances competing goals, and that LAWA's
sanctions threaten IRCA's carefully balanced and constructed objectives.81
Finally, Justice Breyer asserted that federal immigration law preempts
LAWA's E-Verify mandate because under federal law, the program is
voluntary.82 Justice Sotomayor also dissented, contending that the Court's
reading of IRCA's savings clause runs contrary to its "comprehensive
Justice Sotomayor
scheme" for prohibiting unauthorized workers.
additionally argued that federal law impliedly preempts LAWA's E-Verify
84
provision.

Congress provided for states to implement sanctions through licensing laws).
78. See id. at 1983-84 (finding that IRCA operates unimpeded by LAWA since the
latter regulates employers through licensing laws, which is not an area of uniquely
federal regulation).
79. See id. at 1985-86 (reasoning that because IIRIRA's E-Verify provision only
explicitly refers to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the provision's constraints
merely limit the actions of the Secretary of Homeland Security).
80. See id. at 1987 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress did not intend the
licensing exception to be so broad that it would "eviscerate" IRCA's preemption
provision).
81. See id. at 1992 (asserting that the majority's reading of LAWA's licensing
exception undermines Congress's creation of a preemption provision to protect its
careful balancing of sanctions and procedural protections when it enacted IRCA).
82. See id. at 1995-97 (explaining that mandating the use of E-Verify, which
federal law makes voluntary, necessarily obstructs achieving Congress's full purposes
and objectives).
83. See id. at 1998 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that LAWA does not fall
within IRCA's savings clause, and that it is preempted because it creates a mechanism
for state courts to determine if an employer has knowingly employed an unauthorized
alien).
84. See id. at 2005-07 (detailing that by mandating the use of E-Verify, LAWA
directly regulates the relationship between the federal government and pnvate parties
and interferes with Congress's significant policy objectives).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Should Have Held That IRCA Expressly Preempts
LA WA Because a Contextual Analysis oflRCA Demonstrates That LA WA's
Licensing ProvisionsDo Not Fall Within IRCA's Savings Clause.
A state law that imposes employer sanctions for knowingly employing
an unauthorized alien must fall within IRCA's savings clause to be valid,
and thus the state law must be a "licensing or similar law" to avoid
preemption. 85 In determining whether LAWA's employer sanctions fit
within the bounds of IRCA's savings clause, the Court should have referred
to IRCA's legislative history to determine the scope of the word "license"
An examination of IRCA's legislative
within IRCA's savings clause.
history suggests that Congress intended a narrow definition of "license,"
and thus the Court should have held that IRCA expressly preempts
LAWA's sanctions.
1. The Supreme CourtIncorrectlyHeld That LA WA's Licensing Provisions
Fall Within IRCA's Savings ClauseBecause the Court's Statutory
InterpretationDidNot Considerthe Entire Text of lRCA, IncludingIts
Purpose,Context, Goals, andPolicies.
Because the Court relied almost solely on a dictionary and
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) definition of "license" to conclude
that IRCA's savings clause supports LAWA's employer sanctions, it
incorrectly held that LAWA is not expressly preempted by IRCA. First,
the Court's reliance on the APA was problematic because IRCA and the
APA are unrelated statutes. 8 The APA does not definitively demonstrate
that the meaning of "license" within IRCA's savings clause supports
LAWA's use of employer sanctions because the APA does not strongly
pinpoint the definition of non-procedural, isolated terms in unrelated
federal statutes.89 Second, a dictionary definition of "license" does not
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (stating that a state law which imposes civil
or criminal sanctions is preempted by IRCA unless the state law is a "licensing or
similar law").
86. Cf Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486-87 (2006) (demonstrating
that statutory context can determine whether a word in isolation requires a broad or
narrow reading to avoid giving federal statutes an unintended reach).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986) (suggesting that Congress
intended the "licensing and similar laws" language in IRCA to be limited to "fitness to

do business laws").

88. Compare H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 85 (1986) (stating that the primary purpose
of IRCA is to increase control over immigration), with H.R. REP. No. 1980, at 1, 18
(1946) (providing that the fundamental purposes of the APA are to improve fairness
and to inform individuals of their rights under administrative law).
89. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1988 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that
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sufficiently demonstrate Congress's intent for the scope of the savings
clause within IRCA's preemption provision because the dictionary
definition does not by itself establish that Congress intended a broad
definition of "license." 90 Finally, the Court should have also considered
IRCA's legislative history to interpret the correct scope of IRCA's savings
clause because the plain language of the savings clause does not strongly
support the Court's reasoning that Congress intended "license" to apply to
the broadest range of permissions. 91
The Court appropriately began its statutory interpretation with an
analysis of the plain language of the statute. 92 However, interpreting the
word "licensing" in isolation should not provide a controlling interpretation
of "license" within IRCA's savings clause.93 Isolated words cannot take
into account the object and policy of a statute, which is crucial in
determining the scope of a word's meaning.94 Because there is ambiguity
concerning whether a broad or narrow definition of "license" applies to
IRCA's use of the word in its savings clause, the Court's analysis should
have gone beyond the plain language of the statute. 95
Because LAWA facially imposes its sanctions through "licensing" laws,
the Court preceded its express preemption analysis by stating it would
focus on the plain wording of IRCA.96 The Court argued that the APA
statutory context must be used to determine the scope of the word "licensing" within
IRCA's savings clause, because dictionary and APA definitions do not adequately
clarify Congress's intent for the application of "license" within IRCA).
90. See Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486 (demonstrating that a dictionary definition is not
controlling where it would broaden the applicability of the statute).
91. See id. at 486-87 (interreting an isolated phrase requires evaluating the
statute's context and purpose where an ordinary usage definition implies a broad
application of the phrase).
92. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (explaining that
statutory interpretation begins with the express language of the statute to minimize
inferring language that does not appear on the statute's face (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000))).
93. Cf Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486 (demonstrating that although the definition of a
phrase in isolation might provide a broad range of acts that apply to a statute, this
definition would go beyond the statutory intent when considering the statute's purpose
and context).
94. See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,
455 (1993) (providing that the Court has repeatedly stressed that isolated words or
sentences do not provide a reliable guide to a statute's plain meaning, and thus the
Court must look to the whole statute, including its objective and policy (quoting United
States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849))).
95. See id. (explaining that determining statutory meaning is a holistic task,
therefore, at a minimum a statute's meaning is derived from its language, punctuation,
structure, and subject matter).
96. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977
(2011) (asserting that the plain language of a statute provides the best proof of
Congress's preemptive intent when a federal statute contains an express preemption
clause).
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definition of "license" supports LAWA's definition as falling within the
bounds of IRCA's savings clause because LAWA's definition "largely"
coincides with APA's definition.97 However, one problem with the Court's
heavy reliance on the APA's definition of "license" to support its argument
that LAWA falls plainly within IRCA's savings clause is the source of the
definition itself. IRCA does not include a definition of "license" nor does
the word appear again outside of the savings clause to provide a
comparison of statutory usage.98
While the APA does include a codified definition of "license," it is an
unrelated statute and is not persuasive in supporting the argument that
Congress intended the IRCA savings clause to apply broadly to any type of
permission.99 When the Court has looked to the APA to clarify definitions
in the past, it has routinely used the APA definitions to clarify procedural
issues or to supply a procedural standard where the statute in question is
missing one.' 0 0 Thus, utilizing the APA to pinpoint IRCA's definition of
"license" does not correspond with Court precedent because "license" is an
isolated noun that is contained in a statutory provision that has nothing to
do with procedure.
Aside from improperly using the APA's definition of "license" as a tool
for interpreting the plain meaning of IRCA's savings clause, the Court did
not have a strong basis for concluding that the LAWA definition is
"largely" duplicative of the APA definition of "license." A comparison of
the two definitions shows that LAWA utilized key language from the
federal definition to list the types of documents that are included within a
general definition of "license. " LAWA's definition of "license" includes
97. See id. at 1978 (demonstrating that Arizona's general definition of "license"
generally repeats the language used in the definition of "license" as codified in the

APA).
98. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 110
Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7, 8, 20, 26, 29, 40, 42, and 50
U.S.C.); see also Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1998-99 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that the lack of a definition of "license" and the lack of repeated use of
the word in IRCA, combined with the broad range of licensing sanctions, generally
results in a lack of textual clarity regarding the scope of IRCA's savings clause).
99. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1988 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (arguing that relying on
APA to demonstrate congressional scope for the meaning of "license" within IRCA is
futile since the definition of "license" within the APA does not provide a basis for
knowing the scope of "license" that Congress intended in IRCA's savings clause). See
generally H.R. REP. No. 1980, at 1, 18 (1946) (providing that the APA was enacted in
1946 to regulate administrative procedure to improve efficiency and fairness within
federal government operations).
100. See United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002) (utilizing the APA's
prescribed scope of judicial standard of review to apply to an appeal of a petition for
fitness to possess a firearm); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135-37 (1991) (deciding
that although the Equal Access to Justice Act defines "adversary adjudication" as
adjudication under section 554 of the APA, administrative deportations hearings do not
qualify as "adversary adjudication," and thus the APA definition does not apply).
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"any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter or similar
form of authorization that is required by law and that is issued by any
agency for the purposes of operating a business" in Arizona.10 1 The APA's
definition of "license" includes "the whole or part of an agency permit,
certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exception,
or other form of permission."l 02
The Court's use of the word "largely" is quite significant in comparing
the federal definition of "license" to LAWA's. While LAWA's definition
lists the same documents that are included in the federal definition,
LAWA's definition adds three elements that are not present in the federal
definition: (1) the word "any"; (2) the phrase "or similar form of
authorization"; and (3) the qualification "that is required by law and that is
issued by any agency for the purpose of operating a business in this
state."l 03 LAWA's added qualifications are substantive additions to the
APA definition of "license." First, by adding "any" and the phrase "similar
form of authorization," LAWA's qualifications expand the scope of the
type of documents that might qualify as a license, because under LAWA,
any document that is deemed close enough to a licensing document may be
considered a "license."1 04 Second, by adding the qualification "that is
required by law," LAWA affixes legal implications to the definition of
"license," because under certain circumstances, if the court finds an
employer knowingly employed an unauthorized worker, the employer may
lose all authorizations required to lawfully operate a business in Arizona.'os
Thus, while the APA and LAWA definitions are "largely" repetitive of
each other with regard to their basic list of documents, to an Arizona
business owner, the definitions are not "largely" repetitive with regard to
the weight or significance of what falls under LAWA's "licensing" law.
The Court also utilized the APA definition to assert that this codified
definition of "license" provides a clear correlation with LAWA's broad
inclusion of articles of incorporation, certificates of partnership, and grants
of authority to foreign companies to transact business within its definition
of "license." 0 6 Articles of incorporation are a component of a business'
101. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-211(9) (Supp. 2011).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2006).
103. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211(9).

104. Cf Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-31 (2005) (suggesting that a habeas

petitioner's filing of a Rule 60(b) motion is similar enough to a habeas application that
it must be subject to the same procedural requirements).
105. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(F)(2), 23-212.01(F)(2) (designating that

upon the court's finding of a second violation for knowing or intentionally employing

an unauthorized worker, the court shall permanently revoke all licenses held by the
employer).
106. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1978
(2011) (suggesting that because the APA definition includes "registration" and
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corporate charters, thus the Court was not incorrect in asserting there might
be a parallel between LAWA including articles of incorporation in its list
of licensing documents and APA including charters in its definition of
"license."10 7 Further, certificates of partnership can fall within the category
of a type of registration.10 8 Finally, the cases to which the Court cites to
support its argument that state-issued authorizations for foreign businesses
to conduct business within the state have been referred to as "licenses" by
the Court do refer to such grants of permission as "licenses."' 09 However,
the problem remains that the Court depended on an unrelated statute to
demonstrate that the meaning of "license" within IRCA's savings clause
supports LAWA's use of "licensing" sanctions."o The APA and IRCA are
simply too different for the APA to provide a definitive scope of "license"
within IRCA. Because the APA does not apply to employment-related
licensing systems, its definition is not a part of a larger context that
includes employment or immigration-related goals and purposes.
Finally, the Court utilized a Webster's Third New International
Dictionary definition of "license" to support its argument that articles of
incorporation and certificates of partnership fall within the definition of
"license," reasoning that but for these documents, it would be unlawful for
a corporation to engage in business and conduct transactions. 112 While a
"charter," it supports LAWA including these documents within its definition of

"license").
107. Cf United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 610-12 (1974)
(inferring that corporate charters include articles of incorporation by stating that a bank
that does not comply with the state's articles of incorporation requirements might be
subject to loss of its corporate charter).
108. Cf Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1946) (showing that despite the
filing of a certificate of partnership as required by state law for record-keeping
purposes, there was no actual partnership agreement).
109. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1978 (citing G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S.
404, 413 n. 8 (1982), which discussed whether a tolling provision was intended to be a
penalty to force foreign corporations to obtain a state license, and Rosenberg Bros. &
Co. v. Curtis Brown, Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923), which concluded that because an
out-of-state retailer never applied for a license to do business in New York under
foreign corporation laws, the court did not have jurisdiction over the case).
110. Compare H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 85 (1986) (suggesting that the primary
purpose of IRCA is to reduce illegal immigration), with H.R. REP. No. 1980, at 1, 1617 (1946) (providing that the APA is intended to improve fairness in administrative
procedure by providing a means for individuals to know their rights under
administrative law and providing administrators with a simple procedural framework).
111. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (utilizing precedent
that includes a holding regarding negligent operation of postal service vehicles under
the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) to support a determination that the statutory
structure of the relevant FTCA subsection requires a narrow reading of "negligent
transmission").
112. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1978 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-302,
302(11) (1995)) (providing that under its articles of incorporation, a corporation's
powers include conducting business and locating offices); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1304 (2002) (defining "license" as a "right of
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dictionary may be useful in understanding one plain meaning definition of
a word in isolation, a dictionary definition of "license" is not sufficient to
demonstrate Congress's intent for the scope of the savings clause within
IRCA's preemption provision.'
The Court began its express preemption analysis by stating that its
discussion would center on the plain wording of IRCA's savings clause
since it contains the best evidence of Congress's intent.'1 4 However,
because the language of IRCA's savings clause is so limited, focusing
solely on its plain wording necessitates only a limited analysis that relies on
defining the word "license" in isolation."' In its analysis, the Court did not
utilize sources that sufficiently demonstrate that Congress intended the
scope of "license" to reach its broadest possible limit." 6 Because there is
nothing in the plain language of the savings clause to support the Court's
reasoning that Congress intended "license" to apply to the broadest range
of permissions, the Court should have looked to IRCA's statutory context
to determine what Congress intended the scope of "license" to be." 7
2. A Contextual Analysis of lRCA Demonstrates That It Expressly
PreemptsLA WA's Licensing SanctionsBecause IRCA's Legislative History
Establishes That Congress Intended to Limit "Licensingand Similar
Laws" to "Fitnessto Do Business Laws."
A contextual analysis of IRCA that includes its legislative history shows
that IRCA expressly preempts LAWA's employer sanctions because the
latter does not fit within IRCA's savings clause. The Court relied on a
permission" that allows a business to "do some act, or to engage in some transaction
which but for such license would be unlawful").
113. See Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486-87 (demonstrating that where statutory context
suggests a narrow reading of a definition, a dictionary definition that provides a broader
application of the word is not controlling).
114. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977 (suggesting that because express preemption is
in the statutory text, the plain wording best demonstrates the scope of the preemption
provision).
115. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (providing that states are saved from federal
preemption if they utilize "licensing and similar laws" to sanction employers for
violating IRCA).
116. See Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486 (demonstrating that even though a dictionary
definition of a word in isolation would permit the word transmission to apply to a
broad range of negligent acts, statutory context shows Congress intended a narrow
application).
117. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1988 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that only
statutory context can determine whether Congress intended "license" to apply to a
broad definition of that term, because a dictionary definition and unrelated statute
cannot illuminate what Congress intended for the scope of "license" within IRCA);
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486 (demonstrating that where there is doubt concerning the scope
of a definition of a word in isolation, statutory context and precedent can determine
whether a word in isolation requires a broad or narrow reading to avoid giving federal
statutes too broad of a scope).
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dictionary definition and an unrelated statute to support its argument that
LAWA utilizes "licensing" laws to sanction employers, and thus falls
within IRCA's savings clause."' 8 However, the Court also acknowledged
that some of the types of documents that fall within LAWA's "licensing"
sanctions might not actually be "licensing" laws at all.1 9 Because the
Court provides this concession, it is apparent that it should have relied on
statutory context to support its argument that IRCA does not preempt
LAWA's employer sanctions.1 20 A contextual analysis of IRCA further
demonstrates that LAWA's employer sanctions do not fit within IRCA's
savings clause and thus it expressly preempts the State's "licensing"
provisions.
The Court minimized the utility of IRCA's legislative history and
disregarded the reasons why it is necessary in determining the scope of
"license" within IRCA's savings clause.12 1 While IRCA's savings clause
does not receive much attention within its legislative history, one House of
Representatives Report provides a basis for finding that LAWA's employer
sanctions do not fall within IRCA's savings clause. 12 2 House Report 682
indicates that Congress's focus in creating IRCA's preemption provision
and savings clause was to allow states to have the power to suspend,
revoke, or refuse to reissue a license to an employer who violates IRCA's
terms, but also that this power is limited to regulation involving fitness to
engage in a particular business sector.12 3 While the legislative history that
specifically discusses IRCA's savings clause is limited, it nevertheless

118. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980 (maintaining the Court is not required to utilize
legislative history, thus the dictionary and APA definitions sufficiently support
LAWA's use of "license").
119. See id. at 1978 (suggesting that even though articles of incorporation,
partnership certificates, and grants of authority might not be licensing laws, the
dictionary and APA definitions demonstrate they are, at a minimum, similar to
licensing laws, and therefore fall within IRCA's savings clause).
120. See Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486-87 (demonstrating that where a definition of an
isolated word within a statute raises questions about the word's applicable scope,
statutory interpretation requires assessing the statute's purpose and context, and
considering applicable precedent). But see Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980 (rejecting the
use of legislative history to determine whether IRCA preempts LAWA because only
statutory text provides an authoritative statement on a statute's meaning).
121. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980 (arguing that legislative history does not
provide a controlling definition of statutory terms, and suggesting that because only
one congressional report discusses the savings clause, there is not a compelling reason
to utilize IRCA's legislative history).
122. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986) (reiterating the basic language of
IRCA's preemption provision and savings clause, and suggesting that the Judiciary
Committee intended the "licensing and similar laws" language in IRCA to mean
"fitness to do business laws").
123. See id. (stating that the penalties in IRCA are not intended to preempt lawful
state processes, and providing examples of state farm labor contractor and forestry laws
as two types of "fitness to do business laws" that fall under IRCA's savings clause).
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demonstrates that the Court wrongly concluded that LAWA's "licensing"
sanctions fall clearly within the savings clause. 124 The Court rested its
conclusion on sources that provided weak support for finding that IRCA's
savings clause broadly applies to LAWA's definition of "license." 25 When
plain meaning definitions create ambiguity concerning the scope of a
definition's reach, the Court must consider statutory context.'
House Report 682 directly addresses the question at hand-the meaning
of the word "license" within IRCA's savings clause-and is therefore not
only an appropriate component of IRCA's statutory context, but it is also a
necessary tool for determining whether LAWA falls within IRCA's savings
clause despite the Court's reasons for dismissing its utility.' 27 The Court's
reasons for not relying on legislative history are not compelling, and they
do not negate the relevance and usefulness of House Report 682. Further,
the Court asserted that because it previously dismissed House Report 682,
the document has no relevance in determining whether IRCA's savings
clause protects LAWA's "licensing" provisions.1 28 The Court's previous
dismissal of the utility of House Report 682 was within the context of
determining whether IRCA intended the National Labor Relations Board to
have authority to award back pay to unauthorized workers.12 9 While the
Court previously concluded that House Report 682 does not support
awarding a back pay remedy to unauthorized workers, employee remedies
were not an issue in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting.
Thus, even assuming the Court was previously correct in dismissing the
utility of House Report 682, that dismissal was limited to a very specific
context that does not apply to IRCA's preemption provision.

124. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987) (demonstrating that

upholding a savings clause that would allow a state law to undermine a carefully
constructed statute is analogous to allowing states to "do indirectly what they could not

do directly").

125. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977-79 (utilizing the APA and Webster's
Dictionary definitions of "license" to assert that IRCA does not expressly preempt
LAWA's employer sanctions).
126. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486-87 (2006) (demonstrating
that courts must consider Congress's purpose and statutory context where there is a
possibility that the ordinary meaning and usage definition might be too broad).
127. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980 (declining to use House Report 682 because it
is not an authoritative statement on the statutory text, it does not add anything beyond
the language of the statutory text, it is the only legislative history document pertaining
to IRCA that discusses the savings clause, and it has been dismissed by the Court in a
prior case).
128. See id. at 1980 (pointing to a footnote where the Court previously dismissed
House Report 682 on grounds that it was produced by politically divided Congress
(citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149-50 n. 4 (2002))).
129. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 149-50 (arguing that
authorizing back pay to undocumented workers counters IRCA's provision that renders
it unlawful to obtain employment with false documents).
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A contextual analysis of IRCA suggests that LAWA's employer
sanctions do not fit within IRCA's savings clause because IRCA's
legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the savings clause
to apply narrowly to "licensing and similar laws."o30 The Court's use of a
dictionary definition and an unrelated statute to support its argument that
LAWA falls within IRCA's savings clause ignored the question of scope
that these definitions leave open. Therefore, the Court should have turned
to IRCA's legislative history to clarify the scope of IRCA's savings
clause. 131
B. IRCA Impliedly Preempts LA WA's Licensing Sanctions and E- Verify
Requirement Because IRCA Is a Comprehensive Scheme for Federal
Immigration andLA WA Conflicts with the Statute's FederalExclusivity
and the Full Achievement oflts Objectives.
1. IRCA Is a Comprehensive Scheme for ImmigrationRegulation Through
Employer Sanctions, Therefore It Impliedly Field Preempts LA WA's
Licensing Sanctions.
The Court's holding that LAWA's "licensing" provisions do not conflict
with IRCA ignores the statute's comprehensive regulation of employers
hiring undocumented immigrants. Despite IRCA's enumeration of state
powers to impose licensing sanctions upon an employer who employs
unauthorized immigrants, immigration enforcement is not an area of
regulation commonly left to the states.132 Thus, there is not a presumption
against preemption if Arizona supersedes its powers to issue immigrationrelated sanctions through LAWA's "licensing" provision.13 3 Because
immigration regulation is an area in which federal law is supreme, a state
130. Cf Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495-97 (1987) (demonstrating
the use of legislative history to support the argument that the broad application of the
savings clause in the Clean Water Act in the state law at issue would permit states to do
indirectly what they could not do directly).
131. See Dolan, 546 U.S. at 485-86 (utilizing statutory context to determine the
scope of "transmission" to consider whether Congress intended the phrase "negligent

transmission" to apply to circumstances other than lost, late, or damaged mail).
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006) (designating that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security shall have the authonty to administer and enforce
laws relating to immigration and naturalization and that determinations and rulings by
the Attorney General regarding questions of law pertaining to immigration shall be
controlling); id § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (preempting state or local laws from imposing
civil or criminal sanctions against employers who hire unauthorized aliens with the
exception of "licensing or similar laws").
133. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (showing that
despite an assumed presumption against preemption due to Congress legislating in a
field historically left to the state's police powers, the law in question is preempted by
federal law since it is clear Congress intended to eliminate dual state and federal
regulation of a grain warehouse that obtains a federal license).
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exercise of power must be subordinate to a federal law even in an area
where concurrent power is appropriate.134 As a comprehensive scheme for
preventing the employment of undocumented immigrants in the United
States, IRCA provides the standard for prohibiting employers from hiring
undocumented immigrants.135 Thus, the Court should have held that IRCA
impliedly preempts LAWA, because Congress left no room for state
regulation to augment it.' 3
The Court maintained that LAWA is not field preempted by IRCA,
because Congress did not intend for IRCA to allocate authority exclusively
to the federal government.' 37 While the Court maintained that LAWA is
simply a "licensing" law and that Arizona is therefore exercising the
authority that Congress explicitly preserved for it, the Court's reasoning
relied on an incomplete analysis.' 38 Because immigration law is an area in
which state or local laws must not interfere, an analysis of whether IRCA
preempts LAWA must take into consideration a wide range of factors,
including whether the federal legislation is in an area where the federal
interest is so strong that Congress intended for it to occupy the field.139
The Court's conclusion that Congress did not intend for IRCA to be
exclusive and that as a "licensing" law LAWA falls squarely within
IRCA's savings clause rests on the assumption that LAWA's sanctions are
indeed pursued through licensing laws.14 0 Instead, the Court should have
134. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61-63 (1941) (explaining that because
immigration is included in the field of foreign affairs, the Constitution establishes that
federal statutes creating immigration regulations trump state laws that interfere with the
federal law).
135. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147-48 (2002)
(designating IRCA as a comprehensive scheme that brought the employment of
undocumented immigrants to the forefront of immigration law and policy); Hines, 312
U.S. at 66-68 (explaining that where Congress legislates a complete scheme of
regulation in an area of law where it has superior authority over states, Congress
creates a standard of regulation with which state laws cannot interfere).
136. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 72-74 (reasoning that because Congress added to the
comprehensive scheme of federal immigration an intricate alien registration system,
Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act is preempted because it enforces additional
regulations and therefore interferes with the federal law).
137. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1983-85
(2011) (explaining that because IRCA preserved states' authority to impose licensing
sanctions, it was not intended to prevent states from exercising any authority).
138. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-63 (emphasizing that even if a state can legislate in a
particular area of immigration law, the state's power must be subordinate to federal
immigration law concerning the same subject since the Constitution makes clear that
Congress has supremacy in the field of foreign affairs, including power over
immigration).
139. See id. at 66-67 (stating that while there is no rigid test for determining whether
a state law conflicts or curtails a federal law, the Court must consider Congress's
purpose and goals within the context of whether the legislation is in a field that
Congress traditionally occupies).
140. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (stating that the Petitioners' argument that
LAWA necessarily conflicts with IRCA is without reason since Congress expressly
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considered whether Congress intended IRCA to be a comprehensive
scheme for regulating immigration.141
The Court did not analyze whether the structure and provisions of IRCA
demonstrate that Congress intended it to be a comprehensive plan for
controlling immigration through employer sanctions. This approach was
wrong because the Court should have considered congressional intent in its
statutory interpretation.142 Instead, in dismissing the argument that LAWA
necessarily conflicts with federal law because Congress intended IRCA to
be exclusive, the Court stated that LAWA implements sanctions through
licensing laws, thus the Arizona law is doing exactly what Congress
expressly allows it to do.143 Even though the Court designated LAWA's
sanctions as "licensing" laws, LAWA nevertheless adds to IRCA's
employer sanctions provisions, despite IRCA explicitly stating that
enforcement of immigration laws in the United States should occur through
LAWA's "licensing" sanctions
a nationwide, uniform system.'"
encompass a broader scope of sanctions than do IRCA's because under
LAWA, an employer is subject to increased burdens and penalties.
First, under IRCA, an employer is only subject to civil or criminal fines,
and sometimes criminal punishment, for knowingly employing an
unauthorized immigrant.14 5 Under LAWA however, an employer is subject
to the "business death penalty" under certain circumstances.1 46 Second,
IRCA establishes a centralized system of filing complaints and
investigating complaints that have a "substantial probability of validity,"
and it even designates a federal enforcement unit whose primary duty is to
prosecute employers for knowingly hiring an unauthorized immigrant.147
LAWA however, allows anyone to file a complaint anonymously, and it

allows states to impose employer sanctions through licensing laws).
141. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-68 (providing that because the Alien Registration Act
is a "complete scheme of regulation" within immigration law, state law cannot interfere
with it).

142. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992)
(stating that Congress's purpose is one of the most significant factors in determining
whether a state law is preempted by federal law).
143. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (explaining that because Congress included a
savings clause in IRCA's preemption provision, it did not intend to keep states from
exercising the specific authority to impose sanctions through licensing laws).
144. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115,
100 Stat. 3359, 3384 (1986) (stating that Congress intended immigration laws to be
enforced both vigorously and uniformly).
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2006).
146. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(F), 23-212.01(F) (Supp. 2011)
(providing that the court must revoke all business licenses held by an employer upon
committing a second violation for knowingly or intentionally hiring an unauthorized
alien).
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e).
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states that the local law enforcement must investigate the complaint and
bring action against an employer if the attorney general or county attorney
determines the complaint is "not frivolous."l 4 8 These differences in both
the harshness of possible penalties and the adjudicatory process suggest
that LAWA augments the federal scheme for employer sanctions that
Congress devised in its enactment of IRCA, which runs contrary to
precedent establishing that where Congress has superior authority in a
given field and creates a complete scheme of regulation, states cannot
enforce additional regulation.14 9
While the Court did not utilize DeCanas v. Bica to bolster its conclusion
that LAWA is not preempted by IRCA under the doctrine of implied field
preemption, its discussion of DeCanasearlier in the Opinion suggests that
underlying much of the Court's analysis is the proposition that states retain
power to enforce employer relationships, including employment-related
laws that impact undocumented immigrants. 50 While the essential holding
of DeCanas, that not every state or local measure relating to immigrants is
automatically preempted by federal law, is still relevant law, DeCanaswas
decided ten years before the enactment of IRCA.' 5 ' Thus, the outcome of
DeCanas would likely be different today, since IRCA added to the INA a
comprehensive federal scheme of employer sanctions.152
In addition to a structural analysis of the legislation in question, the
Court has looked to legislative history to determine Congress's purposes
and goals and to ascertain whether Congress intended a scheme of
regulation so thorough that any state interference would necessarily conflict
with it.153 Reviewing IRCA's legislative history strongly suggests that

148. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(C), 23-212.01(C).
149. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1941) (holding that because
Congress enacted a complete scheme of alien registration via the Alien Registration
Act, the state's own alien registration system is preempted even though it does not
conflict with the federal statute).
150. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974
(2011) (articulating the proposition that because states have historic police power to
regulate employment relationships, and because the federal government is not heavily
involved in the employment of undocumented immigrants, a state law may prohibit the
employment of undocumented immigrants (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
356-60 (1976))).
151. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355-56 (limiting immigration regulation to
determining admission into the country and designating conditions for remaining in the
country).
152. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)
(stating that in enacting IRCA, Congress forcefully made eliminating employment of
undocumented immigrants central to federal immigration law and policy).
153. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67-68 (utilizing legislative history to show that
Congress, under its constitutional authority, carefully balanced many considerations in
enacting the Alien Registration Act and thus provided a comprehensive national
standard for alien registration).
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Congress intended for a comprehensive federal system of preventing the
employment of undocumented immigrants to be a part of its generally
First, IRCA's legislative history
exclusive control of immigration.
demonstrates that Congress's purpose in amending the INA through IRCA
was to control unauthorized immigration to the United States through
employer sanctions.154 Second, reviewing IRCA's legislative history
suggests that Congress intended a uniform, national system of immigration
enforcement through employer sanctions.'55 Third, Congress's methodical
balancing of numerous policy considerations, such as deterring the
employment of unauthorized workers, avoiding employer burdens,
protecting employee privacy, and preventing employment discrimination,
suggests that it intended IRCA to be a comprehensive system of
immigration reform.5 5
The Court failed to adequately demonstrate that Congress did not intend
IRCA to be a comprehensive federal system of prohibiting employers from
hiring undocumented immigrants and that as a result, a state law that
interferes does not necessarily conflict with the federal law. 57 The Court
simply dismissed the Petitioner's argument that Congress intended IRCA to
be an exclusively federal system by turning to LAWA's plain language and
suggesting that because it is simply a "licensing" law, it does nothing to
upset the balance of Congress's scheme for immigration regulation.' 58 By
reasoning that LAWA's sanctions are more closely related to licensing
regulations than immigration regulations, the Court dismissed the
application of cases that support the argument that LAWA necessarily
conflicts with federal law.19
However, this argument ignores the
154. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46-49 (1986) (stating that the purpose of the
Act is to control immigration to the United States, principally through imposing
employer sanctions, and to make changes in the legal immigration system); H.R. REP.
No. 99-1000, at 85 (1986) (Conf. Rep.) (stating the purpose of amending the INA with
IRCA is to effectively control unauthorized immigration to the United States).
155. See H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 85 (explaining that Congress intended that
employers would be able to rely on the Act's details on compliance with employee
venfication requirements).
156. See S. REP. No. 99-132, at 7-13 (1985) (demonstrating that while reducing
incentives to enter the United States is one of two solutions to reducing the problem of
illegal immigration, an effective employer sanctions program necessitates complex
legislation).
157. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 72-74 (advancing that because the Alien Registration
Act is a complete system of alien registration that was intended to be a part of a
uniform, national system of immigration law, the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act
interferes with the federal law and is therefore preempted).
158. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1983-85
(2011) (suggesting that LAWA's licensing sanctions more appropriately fall into the
category of in-state licensing laws as opposed to immigration laws, and thus do not
involve a uniquely federal area of regulation).
159. See id. at 1983-84 (stating that cases involving uniquely federal areas of
regulation are inapplicable to the issue of whether IRCA preempts LAWA's licensing
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possibility that LAWA's sanctions fall within federal immigration
regulation and thus necessarily conflict with it.160 Simply calling a law a
"licensing" law does not necessarily make the law fall within IRCA's
savings clause when the result is that a state can mold nearly any
permission-related law into an employment-related "licensing" law.16 1
IRCA is a complex scheme of immigration regulation that provides a
standard for employment verification and employer sanctions among other
provisions. Even though its savings clause allows states to impose
licensing sanctions in the instance that employers knowingly employ
unauthorized immigrants, this does not negate IRCA's status as a complete
federal system of immigration regulation.162
2. LA WA Presents an Obstacle to Fully Achieving the Purposesand Goals
of JRCA, Therefore It Is Impliedly Conflict Preemptedby IRCA.
Even if Congress did not intend for IRCA to occupy the field of
immigration-related employment regulation, LAWA conflicts with the
purposes and goals of IRCA. The Court was wrong to ignore Congress's
careful balancing of varying purposes and goals in its enactment of
IRCA balances three competing goals-discouraging
IRCA.16 1
employment of unauthorized workers, preventing burdens on employers,
and preventing discrimination against job applicants who appear foreignand the statute's preemption clause is intended to prevent states from
Because LAWA does not protect
upsetting this careful balance.'6
employers from unnecessary burdens and is silent on issues pertaining to
discrimination, LAWA only furthers one of IRCA's objectives, deterring
the employment of unauthorized workers.' 6 5 Thus, the Court should have
sanctions because licensing is not a uniquely federal concern).
160. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-68 (showing that where Congress enacts a complete
scheme of immigration regulation and provides a standard for enforcement, state laws
can neither interfere with it nor augment it by enforcing additional regulations).
161. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1992-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (articulating that
there is no evidence to demonstrate that Arizona has ever included corporate charters
and partnership certificates within employment-related laws, and allowing it to do so
authorizes states to undermine IRCA's preemption provision).
162. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67 (stressing that because regulation of immigration
is a federal power, even where a state properly enacts a law pertaining to immigration
under its powers, it must yield to federal law acting on the same issue).
163. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1989-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that
the Court's reading of the savings clause facilitates interference with Congress's
purposes and objectives because it allows states to undermine Congress's reconciliation
of competing objectives).
164. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1987) (showing that
even if a state and federal law share the same goal, a state law is preempted if it upsets
the balance of interests Congress included in the Act).
165. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-214 (Supp. 2011) (providing that
LAWA pertains only to employer sanctions for knowingly or intentionally hiring an
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held that IRCA impliedly preempts LAWA's "licensing" sanctions because
they interfere with the execution and achievement of Congress's purposes
and objectives in enacting IRCA.166
a.

LA WA Imposes IncreasedBurdens on Employers, thus It
Conflicts with Congress'sCareful Balance of Objectives in
Enacting IRCA.

The Court should have concluded that LAWA conflicts with IRCA,
because in addition to subjecting Arizona employers to increased burdens
to remain in compliance with the law, LAWA also exposes Arizona
employers to an increased risk of erroneous prosecution.16 7 To minimize
burdens on employers, IRCA established both an employer verification
system and centralized federal enforcement procedures.16 8 Also, it limits
LAWA
sanctions primarily to monetary fines of up to $16,000.16'
in
certain
cases,
contrarily creates a separate enforcement system, and
70
imposes a "business death penalty" on an employer.1
The Court suggested that because LAWA, as a "licensing" law, draws
much of its language and general provisions from IRCA, Arizona is merely
using the powers Congress specifically preserved for it in its enforcement
of LAWA.17 ' However, the Court's reasoning is problematic, because it
omitted important elements of both IRCA and LAWA. IRCA carefully
unauthorized worker and does not include a provision for immigration-related

employment discrimination); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1990-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that LAWA subjects employers to increased burdens because of the
harshness of sanctions and increased risk of erroneous prosecution).
166. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67 (showing that where Congress, under its
authority, regulates immigration, a state law acting on the same subject is preempted if
it interferes with the federal standard).
167. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494-96 (showing that a state law is preempted for
interfering with the methods a federal statute uses to reach a goal where the savings
clause would preserve actions that would disrupt Congress's balancing of interests).
168. See generally H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 56-62 (1986) (demonstrating that
Congress designed its verification system to be the least disruptive approach for
business owners and to protect employers from sanctions through good faith
compliance with the system).
169. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2006) (establishing civil penalties up to $10,000);
8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)(ii) (2011) (adjusting the civil penalties for offenses occurring
on or after March 27, 2008).
170. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(B)-(F), 23-212.01(B)-(F) (designating
that the attorney general or county attorney shall investigate a complaint and shall
notify certain federal and local government agencies if the complaint is deemed neither
false nor frivolous, and that a county attorney will bring action for violation of hiring
an unauthorized alien).
171. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981-82
(2011) (stressing that Arizona protects state and federal balance of interests by utilizing
the federal definition of "unauthorized alien," and providing that because the Arizona
court cannot independently make a final determination of work authorization, LAWA
does not conflict with IRCA at any stage).
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incorporates employer verification requirements that are minimally
burdensome for employers to comply with and that provide employers with
reliance on a good faith defense for complying with the employee
verification requirements designated by IRCA.' 7 2
While the Court
maintained that LAWA provides employers with a good faith defense of
compliance with the 1-9 verification process equivalent to IRCA's, it
neglected to consider that under federal law, the 1-9 is only applicable to
federal enforcement of IRCA.173 Thus, under LAWA, an employer may
not have the same protections it would be afforded under federal law,
which demonstrates that LAWA conflicts with IRCA's verification
requirements. 174
While the Court stressed that under LAWA, Arizona courts may not
independently make a final determination of work authorization and that
the state court may only consider the federal government's determination
of worker authorization, the Court failed to address LAWA's rebuttable
presumption provision.175 A facial reading of LAWA demonstrates that a
federal determination of a worker's unlawful status is conclusive against
the employer, but that the Arizona court may rebut a federal determination
of a worker's lawful employment status.17 6 Thus, while the Court was
correct in stating that under LAWA, Arizona courts may not independently
make a final determination of work authorization, its failure to consider
LAWA's rebuttable presumption provision is problematic when
considering whether LAWA conflicts with IRCA.1n

172. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (showing that employers only have to meet the
burden of examining the documents and attesting that the documents appear to be
genuine); id. § 1324a(a)(3) (stating that as long as an employer complies with IRCA's
verification requirements, the employer establishes a good faith defense for following

IRCA's statutory requirements).
173. See id. § 1324a(b)(5) (stating that the 1-9 may only be used for enforcement of
IRCA). Compare id. § 1324a(a)(3) (establishing a good faith defense for employers
who follow IRCA's verification requirements), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23212(J) (stating that complying with IRCA's verification requirements establishes an
affirmative defense against knowingly employing an unauthonzed worker).
174. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1987) (showing that
where a state law imposes discharge standards different from those imposed by the
Clean Water Act, it interferes with Congress's purposes and objectives and is thus
preempted).
175. See Aliz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(H), 23-212.01(H) (providing that the
federal government's determination of immigration status creates a rebuttable
presumption that the state court may consider in its final determination of an
employee's lawful status).
176. See id

177. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1991-92
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the rebuttable presumption provision
will result in employers discriminating against individuals if they believe the
individuals might be unauthorized to work, which conflicts with IRCA's
antidiscrimination protections).
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The Court also neglected to view the different penalties an employer
faces under LAWA as a reason for finding IRCA impliedly preempts
LAWA, which is problematic because the employer sanctions are part of
Congress's careful balance of purposes and goals in enacting IRCA."'
One difference between IRCA and LAWA is critical-under IRCA, a
violation of knowingly hiring an unauthorized worker subjects an employer
to penalties of up to $16,000, while under LAWA, an employer who
knowingly or intentionally hires an unauthorized worker may lose all
licenses specific to that business location.17 9 The Court minimized this
distinction by stating that the "business death penalty" does not apply for
simply hiring unauthorized workers, it applies to the "far more egregious"
violation of knowingly or intentionally hiring an unauthorized worker a
second time.180 The Court, however, failed to address why LAWA does
not conflict with federal law when an Arizona employer loses all ability to
do business for a second violation, while under federal law, the same
employer would be subject to a fine of up to $6,500."'
b.

LA WA Does Not Adequately Address Employer Discrimination,
thus It Conflicts with Congress's Careful Balance of Objectives in
EnactingIRCA.

LAWA does not include antidiscrimination provisions as part of its
"licensing" sanctions against employers, and therefore LAWA upsets the
balance Congress sought to achieve when enacting IRCA and impliedly
conflicts with the federal law. In enacting IRCA, Congress sought to
prevent employers from discriminating against job applicants who appear
or sound foreign by including antidiscrimination provisions.18 2 The Court
178. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (holding that the state
Alien Registration Act is preempted because it would subject individuals to burdens

they would not be subject to under the comprehensive federal registration system).
179. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (stating that an employer who violates IRCA
three or more times shall be fined up to $10,000), and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)(ii)

(increasing civil penalties to up to $16,000 for third or subsequent violations that occur
on or after March 27, 2008), with ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(F), 23-212.01(F)
(promulgating that upon a second violation of LAWA, the court shall permanently
revoke all licenses).
180. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984 (suggesting that because the business death
penalty only occurs after a second violation, this sanction is fully justified).
181. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493-96 (1987) (explaining that
because Congress created clear comprehensive discharge standards under the Clean
Water Act, the application of state laws that set different standards would cause serious
interference with the Clean Water Act).
182. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv) (setting antidiscrimination fines at levels
equivalent to fines for knowingly hiring an unauthorized worker); see also H.R. REP.

No. 99-1000, at 87-88 (1986) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that IRCA's antidiscrimination

provisions are a complement to the sanctions provisions, thus protecting against the
concern that some employers might avoid hiring people they believe are foreign to
avoid employer sanctions).
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reasoned that because the Arizona law does not displace IRCA's
antidiscrimination provisions, and other anti-discrimination laws at both
state and federal level are still applicable to protect against employer
discrimination, LAWA does not upset Congress's balance of interests.183
This reasoning is problematic, however, because although other remedies
exist for discrimination claims, Congress purposefully included
antidiscrimination provisions within IRCA as a way to effectively reduce
the problem of illegal immigration. 184
The Court should have found that LAWA significantly conflicts with
IRCA because of its failure to balance employer sanctions with
antidiscrimination protections, and therefore should have held IRCA
impliedly preempts LAWA. By complementing sanctions provisions with
antidiscrimination protections, Congress carefully balanced its desire to
reduce illegal immigration with its desire to maintain protections against
national origin discrimination by including a provision that is supplemental
to Title VII.'8 ' Because LAWA only contains employer sanctions rather
than complementing such sanctions with discrimination sanctions, the
enforcement of LAWA undermines Congress's elaborate system of
sanctions provisions.' 86 An interpretation of IRCA's savings clause that
would allow a disruption of this balance of interests runs contrary to
precedent. 87 Even though both IRCA and LAWA are intended to reduce
illegal immigration, Congress balanced this goal with others in establishing
its methods for reducing illegal immigration. The Court should have
reasoned that although other federal and state laws may protect against
discrimination per se, a state law that imposes licensing sanctions for
knowingly hiring an unauthorized worker should also include
antidiscrimination provisions if it is not to interfere with the methods
183. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984 (stating that under federal law, employers are
still subject to IRCA's sanctions and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and under state
law, individuals are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, age, or national origin).
184. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 68 (1986) (stating that even though the
Committee does not necessarily believe discrimination will result from employer
sanctions, the reasonable potential for discrimination necessitates that a remedy for
employment discrimination be included in the legislation).
185. See H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 87-88 (explaining that IRCA's
antidiscrimination provisions broaden Title VII protections against national origin
discrimination while employer sanctions are in effect because of concerns of
discrimination against certain job applicants).
186. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494-97 (demonstrating that, when analyzing whether
a state law is preempted, the Court must consider the methods Congress used to
achieve its purposes and goals).
187. See id. (showing that when a state law interferes with the methods Congress
prescribed to reach the goals of the Clean Water Act, it is preempted even though they
both share the goal of eliminating water pollution).
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Congress established to reach its goals. 88
3. LA WA's E- Verify Requirement Conflicts with FederalE- Verify
Requirements, Therefore It Is Impliedly Conflict Preempted.
The Court also should have held that LAWA's E-Verify requirement is
impliedly preempted because it conflicts with the uniquely federal interest
involved in managing a federal resource.' 89 LAWA's mandate of the use of
E-Verify conflicts with the federal E-Verify program because it requires
employers to participate in a program that is voluntary under federal law.' 90
In its reasoning, the Court first noted that IIRIRA only limits what the
Secretary of Homeland Security may do, therefore LAWA's mandate does
not conflict with federal law.' 9 ' Second, the Court reasoned that because
the consequences of not using E-Verify are the same under both Arizona
and federal law, Arizona's use of E-Verify does not conflict with the
federal scheme.192 Third, the Court gave a lengthy discussion of the federal
government's expansion of E-Verify in addition to its encouragement for
the use of E-Verify. 93
However, not one of the Court's reasons addresses the conflict between
Congress keeping the voluntary nature of the program as part of the statute
and LAWA making its use mandatory. Congress's motives for deciding to
keep E-Verify voluntary were both the cost of making it a mandatory
program and a pattern of inaccuracies in the system.' 94 Because Congress
188. See id. at 494-95 (explaining that because the state law would allow
International Paper Company to circumvent the federal permit program regulating the

discharge of pollutants into bodies of water, it interferes with the Clean Water Act's
methods for eliminating water pollution, and is thus preempted).
189. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)
(stating that where a federal agency regulates a federal resource, federal law may
preempt a state law that conflicts with it).
190. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
(enacted as Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-656 (1996) (stating an employer may
choose to participate in the E-Verify program); see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (stating that when a state provision presents an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's purposes and objectives, it
conflicts with federal law and is impliedly preempted).
191. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985
(2011) (stating that the plain language of IIRIRA contains no language that expressly
circumscribes state action).
192. See id. at 1985-86 (recognizing that the only result of failing to comply with EVerify under both Arizona law and federal law is the forfeiture of a rebuttable
presumption of compliance with the law).
193. See id. at 1986 (explaining that while E-Verify was originally made available to
only six states and was meant to last four years, Congress has extended E-Verify four
times and has made it available in all fifty states; and that the Executive Branch has
mandated participation for federal contractors).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 108-304, pt. 1, at 5-6 (2003) (stating the efficiency of EVerify database is negatively impacted by inaccuracies in the INS database and that
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has valid policy objectives underlying its decision to keep the program
voluntary, a state law such as LAWA places unwanted burdens on federal
government resources, and the Court should have held the federal law
impliedly preempts Arizona's mandate of the program.' 95
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Court's decision in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.

Whiting suggests that the Court will uphold state laws that attempt to
broadly enforce unauthorized immigration through employer sanctions. 96
Further, as predicted by various sources, states are increasingly passing
laws similar to LAWA that utilize "licensing" sanctions to punish
employers for hiring undocumented workers.19 7 In 2011, seventeen states
and Puerto Rico enacted employment-related immigration laws, many of
which impose employer sanctions for hiring unauthorized workers.19 8
Further, during the same period, eleven states enacted E-Verify legislation
that mandates use of the program for employment verification.' 99
As a comprehensive scheme for regulating immigration through
employer sanctions, Congress carefully balanced several policy goals:
discouraging illegal immigration through employer sanctions, minimizing
employer burdens, and minimizing employment discrimination.200 While
Congress did include a savings clause in its preemption provision, this
clause was not likely intended to allow states to enact laws like LAWA that
define "licensing" broadly and permit states to destroy businesses and
while a nationwide voluntary program would cost $11 million, the cost of a nationwide
mandatory program would be $11.7 billion).
195. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'1 Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992)
(stressing that preemption analysis rests primarily on congressional intent).
196. Cf Lozano v. Hazleton, 620 F.3d. 170, 221-24 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S.
Ct. 2958 (2011) (vacating and remanding for consideration in light of Whiting the
Third Circuit's holding that a Pennsylvania statute with language similar to LAWA
was impliedly preempted by IRCA).
197. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 1 (suggesting that states are following Arizona's
lead by passing immigration-related employer sanction laws).
198. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS
AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1-DEC. 7, 2011) 5-6 (2011) [hereinafter NAT'L
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/
LAWS],
CONF.,
IMMIGRATION-RELATED
201 llmmFinalReportDec.pdf; see also NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2012
IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS, BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1-MAR.

31,
2012)
4
(2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/
ImmigrationReportFinalMay20l2.pdf (stating that in the first quarter of 2012, 35 state
legislatures introduced 119 bills relating to immigration and employment, some of
which would impose employer sanctions for hiring unauthorized immigrants or require
the use of E-Venfy).
199. NAT'L CONF., IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS, supra note 198, at 6.
200. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-132, at 8-9 (1985) (explaining that for employer
sanctions to be a solution to the problem of illegal immigration, the law must include a
verification system that is effective for employers and that avoids discrimination).
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nullify Congress's careful balancing of policy interests, including
minimizing discrimination.20 1
In light of the Court's decision in Chamber of Commerce of the United
States v. Whiting, Congress should amend IRCA and the INA to protect its
balance of interests and maintain a uniform system of immigrant-related
employer sanctions. Because neither IRCA nor the INA includes a
definition of "license," the first step Congress could take is to add this word
to the INA definitions codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101. A codified definition
that includes a clear scope of the word "license" as it should apply to
IRCA's savings clause would allow courts to refer to this definition in
future express preemption disputes rather than heavy reliance on dictionary
definitions, unrelated statutes, and even legislative history.2 0 2
To protect its interests from interference from state laws, Congress might
consider amending IRCA to include qualifications for states that choose to
enact laws imposing immigration-related employer sanctions. One way for
Congress to do this is to include an exception to the savings clause
designating that "licensing and similar laws" shall not incorporate penalties
that supersede federal penalties, diminish antidiscrimination protections, or
circumvent federal procedural protections for employers.203 An exception
to IRCA's savings clause would protect Congress's careful balancing of its
purposes and objectives, and it would also provide courts with a useful tool
for implied preemption analysis. 204
V. CONCLUSION

An examination of IRCA as a whole, including its legislative history,
demonstrates that Congress intended a narrow definition of "license" to
apply to its savings clause, which necessitates a conclusion that IRCA
expressly preempts LAWA's sanctions.205 A structural analysis of IRCA
201. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 58 (1986) (inferring "licensing and similar laws"
should be limited to "fitness to do business laws" by providing examples of farming
and forestry licenses).
202. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1980
(2011) (maintaining the position that statutory text is Congress's authoritative
statement on statutory interpretation (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005))).
203. Cf Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(b)(2)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006) (providing an exception to the Act's insurance savings
clause codified at § 1144(b)(2)(A) that states' employee-benefit plans shall not be
utilized to regulate insurance-related activities that fall under the savings clause).
204. Cf Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740-41 (1985)

(demonstrating that the savings clause exception in § 1144(b)(2)(B) clarifies
Congress's intent for the savings clause in § 1144(b)(2)(A) and supports the conclusion
that the state law that regulates insurance benefits is saved from preemption).
205. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (asserting that where

a statutory phrase in isolation could encompass a broad range of acts, statutory
interpretation requires considering the purpose and context of the statute to accurately
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compels a finding that Congress intended federal exclusivity in
investigating and adjudicating claims that an employer knowingly hired an
unauthorized worker, leading to the conclusion that IRCA impliedly field
preempts LAWA. 06 LAWA interferes with IRCA by disrupting IRCA's
carefully balanced policy objectives, supporting a determination that IRCA
Finally, LAWA's E-Verify
impliedly conflict preempts LAWA.207
mandate is also impliedly preempted, because by mandating a program that
is voluntary under federal law, it interferes with Congress's policy goals.20 8
The Court's analysis should have led to the conclusion that federal law
expressly and impliedly preempts LAWA's employer sanctions and EIn enacting IRCA, Congress intended unvaried
Verify mandate.
enforcement of its comprehensive scheme of employer sanctions.20 9 Given
Congress's intent for uniform enforcement and its careful balancing of
objectives and policies, Congress would not have included a savings clause
that would so easily allow states to undermine IRCA's preemption
210
provision.
The Court's decision coupled with the increasing number of state laws
similar to LAWA suggests that if Congress wishes to protect its careful
balancing of goals and policies, it needs to amend IRCA to clarify the
preemption provision. A codified definition of "license" in the INA's
definition section could assist with express preemption analysis by
delineating the scope of the savings clause.2 1 1 Congress could also include
a savings clause exception to assist in determining whether a state licensing
law impedes the purposes and objectives of IRCA.212 Failing to amend
determine the scope of the phrase).
206. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61-63 (1941) (explaining that because
immigration is included in the field of foreign affairs, the Constitution establishes that
federal statutes establishing immigration regulations trump state laws that interfere with
federal law).
207. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1987) (showing that a
state law disrupts Congress's balance of interests when it incorporates different
methods than a carefully balanced federal law, and is thus preempted).
208. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (stating
that where a state hinders the accomplishment and execution of Congress's purposes
and objectives, it conflicts with federal law and is impliedly preempted).
209. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115,
100 Stat. 3359, 3384 (1986) (expressing that immigration laws are to be enforced
uniformly).
210. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1992
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that a broad reading of the licensing
exception allows states to indirectly do what they could not do directly, destabilizing
Congress's purposes and objectives).
211. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996) (articulating that while
express preemption analysis does not require going beyond the provision's language,
the Court must identify the scope of the preemptive language to preserve congressional
purpose).
212. See generally Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740-41
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IRCA will result in a patchwork of state and local immigration-related
employment laws, which counters Congress's goal of uniform enforcement
of immigration laws when it enacted the statute.2 13

(1985) (utilizing a savings clause exception to show the state law at issue is saved from
preemption).
213. See Immigration Reform and Control Act § 115 (stating Congress's goal of
uniform enforcement of immigration laws).
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